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GOVERNMENTAL SPEECH IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Government, in order to be effective, must actively communicate with
its citizens.' The first amendment, however, neither protects nor ex-
pressly prohibits governmental speech.2 Courts have interpreted the first
amendment to restrict governmental expression that interferes with pri-
vate speech 3 or the democratic process,4 but have not formulated consti-
tutional guidelines for the use of public resources to promote
controversial ideas.5
This Note explores constitutional restraints on government's ability to
use public funds for such purposes. Part I examines government's role in
the "marketplace of ideas." Part II describes the forms of authority gov-
ernment relies on to justify expenditures for expressive activity. Part III
analyzes recent court opinions imposing constitutional restraints on vari-
ous forms of governmental speech. Finally, Part IV concludes that gov-
1. Government communicates with the public in "the form of oral communications, such as
speeches, statements, press conferences, and fireside chats, as well as written communications, such
as pamphlets, books, periodicals, and other publications." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION, 697 (1970). See also infra note 5.
2. The first amendment states, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONT. amend. I. See, eg., Columbia Broadcasting System
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n. 7 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The purpose of
the first amendment is to protect private expression .. "); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wall-
ing, 327 U.S. 186, 193 (1945) (first amendment does not regulate government expression which in no
way restrains private expression); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038
(5th Cir. 1982) ("To find that the government is without First Amendment protection is not to find
that the government is prohibited from speaking ... ").
3. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
5. Government must communicate with the public. Government officials, however, may use
tax dollars improperly to promote their partisan goals, enhance their careers, or act against the
reputation of others. F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 410 (1981). Government
also may use its power to communicate to destroy the underpinnings of democratic government.
"The power to teach, inform, and lead is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and
perpetuate the current regime." Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government
Speech and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 865 (1979) [hereinafter Government Speech].
See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 51-66 (1983) (discussing the vast opportu-
nities for abuse of government communication). Scholars have advocated differing views of the con-
stitutional propriety of government expression. See, e.g., F. HAIMAN, supra; M. YUDOF, supra;
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Established Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104
(1979); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Ziegler, Government Speech and
the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980).
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ernmental communication that advocates a position on a ballot issue is
per se unconstitutional. In addition, governmental speech concerning
issues not before the electorate merits cautious scrutiny to ensure that
such speech does not interfere with private expression.
I. GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
In many instances, governmental speech furthers first amendment
goals. Governmental speech adds to the information available in the
marketplace of ideas, for example, and thereby facilitates informed pub-
lic decisionmaking.6 Governmental speech may bolster the persuasive
force of individual voices, permitting them to compete with more power-
ful groups, 7 or operate as a check on forceful corporate speakers.' Be-
cause government possesses superior resources, relative to most other
speakers, however, the possibility of government monopolizing the mar-
ketplace of ideas exists. Ideally, a free marketplace, where private ex-
pressions compete equally with governmental speech, limits
government's power to persuade the public.9
The marketplace of ideas theory, however, does not determine the ex-
tent to which government may participate in the marketplace. Nor has
the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue. The Court has stated
that government may not prescribe an official position on politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion.10 Government, however,
may use its resources to foster its own objectives and, in reality, often
supports one position over another in an attempt to instill certain values
in the public.1
6. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....");
P.A.M. News Corp. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (government's actions in distribut-
ing information "furthers a cornerstone of the first amendment-the maximum distribution of infor-
mation in the marketplace.").
7. Yudof, Government Speech, supra note 5, at 866-67.
8. Id. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying test for a discussion of corporate speech.
9. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (first amendment preserves an uninhibited marketplace and does not allow monopolization by
the government).
10. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that school
children may refuse to salute the American flag). Commentators have interpreted Barnette as
prohibiting government from compelling persons to affirm a belief in a government position or view.
See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.09D n. 283 (1984).
11. Barnette only prohibits government coercion, not government persuasion. NIMMER, supra
note 10, at § 4.09D n. 283; Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 566-71.
[Vol. 65:209
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In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,'2 the Supreme Court sug-
gested that government may enjoy a first amendment right to free
speech. 3 Holding that the first amendment protects the political speech
of private corporations,14 the Court stated that the identity of the speaker
does not determine the "inherent worth" of the speech. 5 Assuming that
government speech also has "inherent worth," the identity of govern-
ment as the speaker should not matter. The Court further stated, how-
ever, that it would have considered arguments to limit speech if the
corporate speech threatened to denigrate rather than serve first amend-
ment interests. 6 This dictum may check government domination of the
marketplace of ideas. 7
II. GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY: STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Permitting government to communicate freely on political issues may
allow government to wield excessive power in the marketplace of ideas
and undermine the democratic process.18 State courts have limited gov-
ernment's power by disallowing the use of public funds for the advocacy
of issues currently before the electorate. These courts usually avoid the
constitutional issues, however, focusing instead on whether government
held statutory authority to speak.' 9
In the early cases, courts refused to permit governmental speech unless
they found clear statutory authority for its exercise. In Mines v. Del
Valle,2" the California Supreme Court found the use of public funds to
advocate the adoption of a proposition "manifestly unfair and unjust to
12. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
13. See generally Yudof, Government Speech, supra note 5, at 866-67; Ziegler, supra note 5, at
602.
14. Id. at 795. In Bellotti, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting corporations from
expending funds to influence the vote on an issue before the electorate. Id.
15. Id. at 777.
16. Id. at 789.
17. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the Court invalidated government
restrictions on powerful sources of private speech. The restrictions were intended to enhance the
speech of less powerful competing sources. The Court stated that such restrictions were "wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 48-49. The Buckley holding suggests that restrictions on
government speech may be equally impermissible. Commentators suggest that Buckley and Bellotti
can be reconciled by comparing the scope of the restrictions. Ziegler, supra note 5, at 599-601.
18. See Kamenshine, supra note 5, at 1105 (government monopolization may give government
the power to manipulate and subvert the process by which people hold government accountable).
See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 20 - 33 and accompanying text.
20. 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
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the rights" of opponents.21 The court stated that it would not sustain
such governmental action unless the legislature granted the power in
"clear and unmistakable language."' 22  Similarly, in Citizens to Protect
Public Funds v. Board of Education,23 the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that a school board had implied authority to expend funds to in-
form voters about a bond proposal but not to advocate voting for or
against the proposal.2a The court concluded that expenditures to support
one side of a political issue required express statutory authority.25
Although these early cases suggest that government may expend funds
to advocate a political position if clear statutory authority exists, recent
cases question whether government speech is ever permissible. In Stern
v. Kramarsky,26 New York taxpayers sued to enjoin a state agency from
supporting a proposed equal rights amendment to the state constitution
that required voter approval.27 Although state law granted the agency
broad authority to promote and protect human rights, the court found
the agency's promotion of political issues inconsistent with the demo-
cratic process. The court ruled that neither the statutory language nor
the statutory scheme allowed an administrative agency to promote pas-
sage of a proposed constitutional amendment. 28  The court concluded
21. Id. at 287, 257 P. at 537.
22. Id. In Mines, the governing board of a municipally owned public utility expended public
funds to promote a municipal bond issue related to expansion of the utility. The board claimed that
their broad authority "[tio construct, operate, maintain and extend" operation allowed the chal-
lenged expenditure. Id. at 281, 257 P. at 534. See also Shannon v. City of Huron, 2 S.D. 365, 69
N.W. 598 (1896) (municipal corporation has only the powers expressly conferred by positive enact-
ment); Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916) (government authority
only if expressly granted). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in State-
wide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1980).
23. 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
24. Id. at 180-81, 98 A.2d at 677.
25. Id. In Citizens to Protect Public Funds, the school board used public funds to publish a
booklet pertaining to a school building proposal to be financed through a bond issue. The entire
booklet provided factual information except for the inclusion of the phrase "Vote Yes" in two places
and a one page depiction of the hardships that would result from defeat of the proposal. Id. at 175,
98 A.2d at 674. The board's enabling statute authorized the expenditure of funds on items incident
to "the building, enlarging, repairing, or furnishing of a [schoolhouse]." The court found that this
authority implied the power to make reasonable expenditures "for the purpose of giving voters rele-
vant facts." Id. at 179, 98 A.2d at 676. The court reasoned that public funds "belong equally to the
proponents and opponents of the proposition," and the use of public funds to support one side of the
issue would jeopardize the propriety of the entire expenditure. Id. at 180-81, 98 A.2d at 677.
26. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1975).
27. Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37. The agency made available flyers and pamphlets pre-
pared by other organizations and financed a series of radio and television broadcasts. Id.
28. Id. at 450, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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that government must remain neutral on all ballot issues.2 9
Similarly, in Anderson v. City of Boston,3" the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court enjoined the city from expending funds to urge voter ap-
proval of a state constitutional amendment.31 The city claimed authority
under the state's home-rule amendment to allocate funds for this pur-
pose. The court ruled that a broad grant of home-rule authority did not
allow city government to advocate a position on an issue facing the vot-
ers. The court found such authority inconsistent with comprehensive
legislative regulation of election financing which encompassed political
contributions and expenditures.32 The court noted that, even assuming
first amendment protection of municipal speech, the state held a compel-
ling interest that would justify such a restraint on government speech.33
The court's analysis, however, suggests that the court would not have
permitted the city's campaign even in the absence of conflicting state
legislation.
III. GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY: CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
Taken together, existing state court opinions do not clearly indicate
whether the constitution prohibits governmental speech. Those courts
that have considered the constitutional ramifications of such speech have
failed to articulate a clear standard. Courts have judged the permissibil-
ity of governmental speech differently depending on whether government
advocates a position on an issue requiring voter approval or an issue not
before the electorate.
Courts never have permitted government to advocate a position on an
issue before the electorate. Several courts have held that this form of
governmental speech conflicts with the general principles of democratic
29. Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The court suggested that the constitution of New York
prohibits promotional activity on the part of the government. Id.
30. 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
31. Id. at 184-85, 380 N.E.2d at 633-34. The amendment concerned real property classifica-
tion. The city funded an office to provide information concerning the proposed amendment and
material urging its approval. Id.
32. Id. at 185, 380 N.E.2d at 633. The court noted that the legislation did not specifically
regulate municipal expenditures for the purpose of influencing election results. The court concluded
that this omission indicated that "the Legislature did not even contemplate such municipal action
could occur." Id.
33. Id. at 192, 380 N.E.2d at 637. The court found that the state has "a substantial, compelling
interest in assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of fairness in the electoral process."
Id. at 193, 380 N.E.2d at 638.
1987]
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process embodied in the constitution.34 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the necessity for governmental neutrality in elections to preserve
the integrity of the electoral process, 35 and state courts have implied that
any governmental interference with the voters' free choice is
unconstitutional.
In Stern v. Kramarsky,36 for example, the New York Supreme Court
found governmental advocacy on a ballot issue an improper government
function.37 The court reasoned that permitting government to use public
funds to support any issue demeans the democratic process. 38 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in Stanson v. Mott,39 relied on similar reasoning to
enjoin a state agency from expending public funds to promote passage of
a bond act."0 The court stated that "free and pure extension of the vot-
ers' choice" constitutes a "fundamental goal of a democratic society.""'
This fundamental principle implies that government may not "take
sides" in an election or confer an advantage on one of the competing
factors.42
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School District #1,43
the Colorado federal district court, in dicta, approved the Stanton consti-
tutional rationale. The court stated that the use of public resources "to
propagandize against a proposal" would violate fundamental principles
34. See infra notes 36 - 55 and accompanying text.
35. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
564-65 (1973). In Letter Carriers, the Court upheld provisions of the Hatch Act prohibiting federal
employees from taking an active part in political campaigns. The Court held this prohibition as
necessary to protect against actual and perceived unfairness in the system. Id. See also Note, supra
note 22, at 554 (noting that Supreme Court cases concerning the proper role of government in elec-
tions suggest "that those processes must be zealously protected if voters are to accept their results as
legitimate.").
36. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1975).
37. Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
38. Id. The court stated that it would be a "dangerous and untenable precedent to permit the
government or any agency thereof, to use public funds to disseminate propoganda in favor of or
against any issue or candidate. This may be done by totalitarian, dictatorial or autocratic govern-
ments but cannot be tolerated, directly or indirectly, in these democratic United States of America."
Id.
39. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
40. The California Department of Parks and Recreation expended public funds to promote a
bond act to provide funds for future acquisition of park land. Id. at 209, 551 P.2d at 4, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 700. The bond issue passed and the plaintiff filed a taxpayers suit seeking to hold the
director of the state agency personally liable for improperly spent funds. Id.
41. Id. at 219, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
42. Id.
43. 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
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underlying the Constitution.' Publicly financed opposition to the exer-
cise of the peoples' right to petition for governmental change, the court
reasoned, would restrain private speech in violation of the first amend-
ment.45 In addition, the court noted that the expenditure of public funds
to oppose citizens' efforts to participate in the democratic process would
violate those basic precepts of our democratic system that the guaranty
clause ensures.46
Although courts have implied that governmental speech on ballot is-
sues cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, courts rarely have consid-
ered constitutional challenges to such speech on nonballot issues. In
Burt v. Blumenauer,4 7 however, the Oregon Supreme Court enunciated a
flexible standard to judge the permissibility of any form of government
speech. The court acknowledged the propriety of some forms of govern-
mental speech provided that such speech was not intended to perpetuate
current governmental officials in office.48 Although the court recognized
that the proposed test would require a difficult line-drawing process, it
did not attempt to draw that line. The court, therefore, left open the
issue of when government speech on a nonballot issue will pass
scrutiny.49
The California Court of Appeals, in Miller v. California Commission
44, Id. at 360. The Denver Board of Education used public funds to urge the defeat of a pro-
posed state constitutional amendment that would affect the authority of all branches of state govern-
ment to spend public funds. Id. at 358. The court issued an injunction based on the finding that the
school board lacked the statutory authority to spend public funds as the board proposed. Id. at 359.
45. Id. at 361.
46. Id. The court stated that where the proposal before the voters fundamentally alters the
authority of government, publicly financed opposition by government shifts the ultimate source of
power away from the people. Rather, the court reasoned, the people as the grantors of that power
hold the right to freely petition to improve the exercise of the power. Id.
The Stern, Stanson and Mountain States courts all invalidated the government speech at issue
based on a finding that government lacked the statutory authority to speak. The courts' discussion
of constitutional issues, therefore, are dicta. See supra notes 26 - 28 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Stern. In Stanson, a provision in the legislative act approving the bond issue for sub-
mission to the voters authorized the agency to expend funds for "advance planning." 17 Cal. 3d at
214, 551 P.2d at 6, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 702. The court stated that it "need not resolve the serious
constitutional question ... because the legislative provisions relied upon... do not authorize such
expenditures .. " Id. at 219, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
47. 299 Or. 55, 699 P.2d 168 (1985).
48. Id. at 61, 699 P.2d at 175.
49. Id. At one extreme lies speech in which government may clearly engage, presumably speech
that falls within the daily routine of government offices. At the other extreme lies speech that is
clearly prohibited, such as government advocacy intended to perpetuate itself in power. In Burt the
court did not explain where the line should be drawn, but merely indicated that "advocacy by 'gov-
ernment' as institutions" calls constitutional principles into question. Id. at 61, 699 P.2d at 175-76.
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on the Status of Women,50 directly addressed this issue. In Miller, a state
commission used public funds to promote ratification of a state equal
rights amendment.5 Ratification required legislative, not voter ap-
proval. The commission's enabling statute expressly authorized the com-
mission to promote its viewpoint on issues within its jurisdiction.5 2 The
taxpayer plaintiffs claimed that the first amendment prohibits govern-
ment from expending tax dollars to advocate its viewpoint. The court
ruled that government may advocate a position on an issue not before the
electorate "provided it does not drown out private communication. '53
Although the first amendment does not allow government to silence
others, the court reasoned, government may add its own voice to the
marketplace of ideas.54
Unfortunately the Miller court did not provide clear guidelines for de-
termining when government speech drowns out private expression. The
court focused, however, on the scale and method of the agency's commu-
nication and noted that "neither the scale of [the commission's] speech
nor the vehicles employed appear likely to drown out" opposing views. 5
50. 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984).
51. Id. at 696, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 879. The California legislature adopted an act creating the
Commission on the Status of Women. The commission established a syndicated newspaper column
and printed various materials, including a newsletter, all encouraging the amendment and related
legislation. None of these issues were before the electorate. Id.
52. Id. at 697, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 879. The statute stated that "[tjhe commission is expressly
authorized to state its position and viewpoint on issues developed in performance of its duties and
responsibilities ... " Id.
53. Id. at 700, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
54. Id. The court stated that the status of women is a legitimate topic of governmental concern
upon which government must communicate. The court reasoned that if government cannot address
such controversial topics, government cannot govern. The court noted, however, that the constitu-
tion prohibits government speech that has "the effect of trammeling the free speech rights of others."
Id. at 701, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
55. Id. at 702, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883. The court noted, however, that the activity did confer an
advantage on the commission's viewpoint. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiff's
complaint was aimed at the commission's ideological content and not with the concept of a commis-
sion speaking about women's issues. The court stated that if the plaintiffs wanted to change "the
tone of the commission's speech ... they must seek redress from the Legislature," which ultimately
has the power to appoint members of the commission. Id.
The plaintiffs in Miller essentially adopted a dissenting taxpayers argument. The argument states
that individuals with opposing views should not be compelled to finance partisan viewpoints with
their tax dollars. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Supreme Court
addressed this concept in a context not involving the government. The Court held that a union can-
not compel members to contribute to organizational speech unrelated to the purpose of the organiza-
tion. Such expenditures abridged the union members' right to refrain from associating themselves
with ideas with which they disagree. Id. at 235-26. The Supreme Court never has permitted dissent-
ers to block government expression in this manner. See Note, supra note 22, at 550.
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The Miller holding, therefore, suggests that government speech on
nonballot issues is proper provided it does not effectively silence the free
speech of others.
IV. GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY: A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
A. Requisite Authority
Courts generally require that the authority to expend public funds for
government speech activity derive from "clear and unmistakable" statu-
tory language. 6 This standard functions as a check on the expenditures
of the various government agencies not directly accountable to the peo-
ple. Courts should continue to require express or clearly implied legisla-
tive authorization to ensure that an accountable body first considers the
desirability of government speech.
B. Constitutional Limitations
Statutory authorization does not shield governmental speech from
constitutional scrutiny. Courts have consistently indicated that govern-
ment advocacy on ballot issues is unconstitutional based on a perceived
threat to the democratic process or a violation of the guaranty and free
speech clauses.57 Although several courts have suggested that such
speech may be permissible under certain circumstances, 58 no court has
upheld governmental speech designed to influence an election. Because
the Constitution mandates a democratic process, courts should never
permit governmental speech on a ballot issue.
Although courts may find governmental speech on a ballot issue un-
constitutional under the first amendment, the first amendment does not
support a per se rule. Rather, it requires courts to determine the point at
56. See supra notes 18 -33 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 34 - 46 and accompanying text.
58. In Anderson, the court did not indicate whether it would have permitted governmental
speech if there had been explicit statutory authority for the expenditures and no conflicting state
financing statute. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Burt the court did not
determine the constitutionality of governmental speech in general but did suggest that some forms of
governmental speech, even on ballot issues, might be permissible. See supra notes 47-49 and accom-
panying text. In addition, the Miller court left open the possibility of permissible governmental
speech on ballot issues stating only that such speech created "a heightened need for constitutionally
based judicial oversight." 151 Cal. App.3d at 702, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883. See supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text.
1987]
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which government speech interferes with private speech. 59 Alternatively,
the guaranty clause could serve as a powerful limitation on governmental
speech. 0 The Supreme Court, however, traditionally has not interpreted
the guaranty clause to provide a source of constitutionally enforceable
private rights.61 Arguably, plaintiffs challenging government speech do
not seek to enforce private rights but seek instead to maintain the integ-
rity of the democratic process.
Preservation of the democratic process is a powerful justification for a
per se rule prohibiting governmental interference in free elections. The
principle that people empower government is fundamental to the consti-
tution.62 Prohibiting government from advocating a position on a ballot
issue prevents the use of governmental power to usurp the power of the
electorate. The democratic process inherent in our constitutional system
thus supports a per se rule against governmental advocacy of election
issues.
Government often expends public funds to espouse views unrelated to
election issues.63 Such governmental speech does not directly threaten
59. See cases cited supra note 2. In Miller, the California Supreme Court adopted a "drowning
out" standard. See supra notes 50 -55 and accompanying text.
60. The guaranty clause provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government ... " U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 4, cl. 1. In Mountain States,
a Colorado district court noted that government expenditures to oppose efforts to participate in the
democratic process violate basic precepts that the guaranty clause ensures. 459 F. Supp. at 361, See
supra notes 43 - 46 and accompanying text.
61. See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 556 (1962). Bonfield notes that since 1912 the Supreme Court
has refused all suits seeking to enforce the guaranty clause. Id. The cases he cites generally involve
actions in which the plaintiffs have asserted that government's action deprives the plaintiff of a right
or benefit.
62. Cf City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976). The Supreme
Court stated that "[u]nder our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who
can delegate it to representative instruments which they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the
people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be
assigned to the legislature." Id. (citations omitted). As applied to government speech on ballot
issues, government should not be permitted to influence matters that the people have reserved to
themselves.
Senator William Fullbright once said, "There is something basically unwise and undemocratic
about a system which taxes the public to finance a propaganda campaign aimed at persuading the
same taxpayers that they must spend more tax dollars to subvert their own independent judgment."
115 CONG. REc. 344 (1969). See also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist.
# 1,459 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1978) (noting that where a proposal is to alter the authority of
government, publicly financed opposition shifts the ultimate source of power away from the people).
63. See supra notes 47 - 55 and accompanying text.
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the democratic process. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 4
however, the Supreme Court expressed concern that a corporate voice
might overwhelm or significantly influence public opinion and threaten
public confidence in government.65 This concern is arguably greater
when government is the competing voice. The Court stated that "if there
be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and argu-
ments advanced,... it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment., 6
6
Despite this danger, government must inform and communicate with
its citizenry.67 Therefore, courts should presume the validity of govern-
mental speech on nonballot issues and proceed with caution. Such an
approach does not accede too much power to governmental speakers be-
cause of the checks on governmental persuasiveness that are built into
the system. For example, in Bellotti the Court stated that the people
have the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments.68 In addition, the public can voice its opposition
to government's views through the electoral process.69 The requirement
of legislative authorization for government speech7° also allows the citi-
zenry to police governmental speech through the polls. Courts, there-
fore, should invoke first amendment protections only if government
attempts to control public opinion, overwhelm opposing voices or mo-
nopolize the marketplace.71 Such government activity effectively coerces
compliance and subverts the check imposed by the electoral process.
A modified form of the Miller "drowning-out" test can effectively de-
termine when government has abused its authority and violated the pub-
lic's first amendment rights. In applying a drowning-out standard, the
64. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Bellotti discussed supra notes 12 - 17 and accompanying text.
65. 435 U.S. at 789-90.
66. Id. at 792.
67. See Yudof, Government Speech, supra note 5, at 865-67. See also Delgado, The Language of
the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U.L. REv. 961 (1984). Delgado
notes that "[m]uch that government wishes to say is harmless or is necessary for effective govern-
ment functioning. For example, government needs to educate, to promote industry and commerce,
and to marshall support for its policies." Id. at 989.
68. 435 U.S. at 791.
69. This can be accomplished in two ways. First, if courts require express authorization for
speech-related expenditures, voters can remove their elected representative. Second, voters can re-
move the administration responsible for the controversial speech. The California Supreme Court
recognized this possibility in Miller. See supra note 55.
70. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 S.w. U.L. REv. 237, 244
(1978).
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Miller court considered the amount of governmental resources expended
and the government's chosen method of communication.72 Courts also
should consider the resources available to competing speakers, the gov-
ernment's purpose in advocating its views and the effect on public
opinion.73
Government can serve as an organized, well-funded system for dissem-
inating information and opinion. If governmental speech competes with
an equally organized and funded voice, the drowning-out phenomenon
probably will not occur. An organized, well-financed government voice,
however, can easily overwhelm private voices that lack resources and ac-
cess to communication channels. Courts, therefore, must determine
whether government has a superior ability to manipulate the marketplace
of ideas relative to those likely to hold an opposing view on the matter.74
Courts also should consider government's purpose for entering the
market. If government enters the marketplace for the specific purpose of
opposing a voice, government's action may violate the first amendment.
Governmental participation in the marketplace of ideas may cause op-
posing voices to expend additional resources in order to maintain their
previous persuasive force. Similarly, if government "raises" its voice for
the specific purpose of overwhelming a subsequent speaker, it may in-
fringe upon that speaker's first amendment rights. Governmental action
that targets specific speakers in order to nullify their effectiveness is evi-
dence of drowning-out.
Both government's purpose in speaking and the amount of resources
government devotes to the expression of its views are irrelevant, however,
if the speech has no effect on public opinion. Public opinion does not
necessarily reflect the resources expended on each side of an issue. Gov-
ernment support, however, may permit an intense minority to over-
whelm an apathetic majority on an issue.75 If government aims its
resources at willing recipients who already agree with its view, the effect
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. One commentator has suggested that courts consider the identity of the speaker, the nature
of the speech, and the speakers appropriate role in the electoral process. See Note, supra note 22, at
563.
74. This necessarily can constitute only one factor. An overemphasis on the available compet-
ing resources may allow plaintiffs with virtually no resources to quell the most nominal forms of
government speech. In addition, government speech may force even a wealthy voice to exhaust
resources by close competition not amounting to drowning out.
75. See Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 571 (1981-82).
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of superior governmental resources decreases. Alternatively, government
may advocate a position that the public strongly opposes or expend funds
to persuade a largely undecided audience. In the latter two instances,
governmental competition in the marketplace of ideas is more likely to
drown out competing voices.
V. CONCLUSION
The first amendment neither protects nor expressly prohibits govern-
mental speech. Although government must communicate with its citi-
zenry, government's superior resources may allow it to dominate the
marketplace of ideas. To ensure that an accountable body has considered
the propriety of government speech, courts should require clear statutory
authority for government expenditures for political advocacy. Statutory
authority, however, does not ensure constitutional validity. Because the
constitution demands a democratic process, courts should find govern-
ment advocacy on issues before the electorate unconstitutional per se. A
per se rule will ensure that the electoral process reflects the will of the
people. When government advocates a position on a nonballot issue, the
first amendment prohibits government from drowning out private
speech. To determine whether government drowns out private speech,
courts should consider the resources expended by government for polit-
ical advocacy, the form of that advocacy, the resources available to op-
posing speakers, government's purpose in speaking and the effect of
governmental efforts. Only by closely evaluating government advocacy
can courts ensure the fair exchange of public and private opinion in the
marketplace of ideas.
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